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Financial  risks are usually analysed by type and by activity using different assumptions and 
methodologies as may seem appropriate in each case.  This approach makes it very difficult to 
ascertain the degree of diversification between various activities and to obtain a proper 
estimate of global risk. We show that different risk aggregation methodologies should be used 
depending on the purpose of the exercise.  In particular, if it is to promote an efficient 
allocation of resources, a short term, normal circumstances view should be adopted, but if it is 
to ensure a high degree of financial soundness over the long term, then extreme circumstances 
and contingency plans should be explored. We propose a simple linear risk factor model in 
the first case but suggest that a full business model is required for the second. Finally, 
financial regulators raise an intermediate question that is almost impossible to answer, 
namely, what is the minimum level of capital consistent with a probability of default of the 
firm of 0.1% over one year, that is consistent with a single ‘A’ rating. We suggest that an 
extension of our normal risk factor model to estimate ‘tail’ effects could give a better 
approximation than the current regulatory rules.   
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Is it Possible to Aggregate Financial Risks Intelligently? 
 
That is the question that has exercised the minds of a great many risk managers over 
the last few years.  Financial regulators are pushing for ever more sophisticated 
methods to estimate ‘risk sensitive’ capital requirements, whilst still asking under 
Basel II proposals for requirements calculated separately for various types of risks and 
businesses to be simply added together to yield a global requirement. 
 
The commonly heard excuse for this blunt approach is that regulators must take a 
prudential view and that addition is safe because it corresponds to a supposedly worst-
case scenario. That is simply not true, at least the way regulatory capital requirements 
are being calculated;  and even if it were true, it would not be desirable since 
ignorance of diversification or hedging of risks can only provide wrong incentives for 
capital allocation.  
 
The question was formally put to us recently by IFCI, an association of major 
financial institutions and consulting firms, that is trying to promote best practice in 
risk management.  This topic has also been picked up by the Joint Forum’s Working 
Group on Risk Assessment and Capital that has recently reported on the state of the 
art in risk i ntegration and aggregation in the financial sector (Basel 2003).  
Interestingly, the Working Group distinguishes integration, meaning the development 
of a common infrastructure for risk management (including policies, personnel, 
systems, databases etc.) from aggregation, meaning the development of  “quantitative 
risk measures that incorporate multiple types or sources of risks”.  Here we address 
the aggregation problem only, leaving aside the integration issue and, indeed, most 
matters of risk management policies. 
 
 
Risk Aggregation for a Purpose 
 
But why should a firm want to estimate its global financial risk in the first place? 
Estimating a global risk is a description problem and as for all such problems, it is 
impossible to say, except from an aesthetic point of view, whether a description is 
good or bad or simply satisfactory without having a purpose in mind, a problem that 
the description should help resolve. Indeed, without a purpose, it would be 
questionable whether the description of complex risks f aced by modern financial 
institutions could ever be reduced meaningfully to a single probability distribution on 
an appropriate scale, not to say to a single number. 
 
In view of the uncritical enthusiasm with which new risk assessment methods, value-
at-risk figures and other economic capital numbers, have been embraced by the 
financial industry and its suppliers and the vast sums that have been invested in the ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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development of risk integration systems, it may be worth recalling the characteristics 
of what Sir Peter Medawar called ‘unnatural science’. To quote:
2 
  
(a) The belief that measurement and numeration are intrinsically praiseworthy 
activities (the worship, indeed, of what Ernst Gombrich calls idola quantitatis) 
(b) The whole discredited farrago of inductivism – especially the belief that facts 
are prior to ideas and that a sufficiently voluminous compilation of facts can 
be processed by a calculus of discovery in such a way as to yield general 
principles and natural-seeming laws; 
(c) (…) faith in the efficacy of statistical formulae, particularly when processed by 
a computer  
 
Medawar was making these remarks about the pseudo-science of IQ measurement, 
but those who might want to develop a universal science of risk measurement could 
equally reflect on them. 
 
For a start, we should ban the term measurement and say risk ‘assessment’.  Risks are 
about the future, an appreciation of potential difficulties or disasters.  Measurements 
can only be about things that exist now or were recorded in the past.  To jump to the 
future we need to make assumptions and to use models that are logical constructs 
build on these assumptions. Assumptions and models can never be validated in an 
absolute sense but they may be deemed acceptable in certain limited circumstances in 
order to support certain decisions. 
 
Decisions that depend on risk descriptions are many.  For example, on a short time 
scale, assuming markets behave normally, risk assessments should help make efficient 
use of resources, that is, achieve the most desirable risk/return trade-offs.  Over the 
long term, managers as well as regulators are concerned about the viability of 
financial institutions. But a firm’s survival depends not only on capital now but also 
on a host of other factors such as a good reputation, a viable franchise, an astute and 
cautious management, and a well-developed risk management function.  On some 
intermediate time scale, regulators would like to ensure that financial firms, given 
their current activities and policies, have enough capital to absorb extreme shocks to 
their P&L such as might happen with a probability as low as 0.1% over one year. 
 
The assumptions, the time scale, the range of factors to be taken into consideration 
and the desired degree of accuracy in the assessment of global financial risks, all 
depend on the application. We shall propose three risk aggregation methodologies to 
address the three types of problems outlined above.  But before we do so, for the sake 
of comparison and to understand the component risks, we need to review  the state of 
the art in risk assessment and aggregation, both as advanced by the regulators and as 
promoted internally within firms. 
 
                                                                 
2 Peter Medawar, review of Leon J. Kamin, The Science and Politics of IQ, New York Review of 
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From Minimum Regulatory Capital to Economic Capital  
 
Governments are well aware of the crucial role played by financial industries and 
financial markets in free market economies. They are particularly concerned about 
ensuring the twin goals of fair competition and financial soundness among financial 
institutions as well as about ensuring fair business practices.  The corollary of freer 
markets is the reinforcement of supervision and regulation of the financial industries 
and in particular the development of so-called risk sensitive capital requirements to 
ensure that financial firms are sufficiently capitalized with regard to the risks they 
take. 
 
We have now seen considerable progress since the first Basel Accord (1988) setting 
minimum regulatory capital (MRC) requirements for banks as a buffer against credit 
risks, which were then regarded as the overwhelming source of banking r isks. 
Successive amendments and now the new Basel II proposals have introduced detailed 
rules to take into account market and other risks and have greatly refined the 
assessment procedures.  Basel has no statutory powers, only moral suasion, but 
competitive pressures and the willingness of many national authorities to follow suit 
has led to a near universal acceptance of these principles in major economies. 
 
Basel’s intention is prudential: primarily, to protect banks’ depositors and other 
creditors by requiring a certain level of financial soundness and, secondarily, to 
provide a basis for fair competition among banks and to contain systemic risks. 
Basel’s intention is neither to define an optimal capital ratio nor to provide guidance 
to bank managers on how to run their business.  Naturally, in as much as the MRC  
constraint is or could become biting, banks have a definite interest in refining its 
calculation method.  But beyond regulations, banks and other financial institutions 
saw in risk assessment and the corresponding linkage to capital, a tool for efficient 
management. 
 
Indeed, company directors must also satisfy the wider and complementary interests of 
shareholders.  To the latter, insolvency is just a worst case to consider when balancing 
risks and returns.  Interestingly, the ratio of average excess return over risk free return 
to volatility of returns, the well-known Sharpe ratio often used in investment 
selection, is not so much dependent on the ratio of equity to total liabilities as it is on 
an  appropriate selection of assets, liabilities and flow businesses.
3  Firms must 
therefore assess risks not so much to satisfy regulatory capital requirements but to 
evaluate risk/return ratios and select an appropriate business mix.  
 
Thus, as far back as the late 1970s, some firms were designing their own, internal risk 
assessment and risk adjusted performance measurement (RAPM) methodologies.
4  
                                                                 
3 It is easy to verify that if a bank funds itself at near the risk free rate, then the Sharpe ratio for 
shareholders is about equal to the Sharpe ratio of the assets, whatever the leverage. 
4 For example, Bankers Trust formally developed the concept of Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital 
(RAROC￿) in the late 1970s and claimed to have been measuring the required risk capital for all 
activities in the entire bank by 1983. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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Because the goals are broader than those of the regulator and the applications are firm 
specific, these internal  methodologies may differ in some respects from regulatory 
rules.  For example, they may use assumptions and internal models adapted to their 
business (e.g., credit portfolio models), subjective views about business and 
reputational risks, and higher standards of minimum capitalization. 
 
But in many respect there are remarkable similarities among internal methods and 
statutory rules. Typically: 
 
•  Risks are assessed from the bottom up starting at the most elemental level (e.g., 
instrument by instrument) and by risk type (i.e., separately for credit, market and 
other risks).  Risk aggregation rules are primitive: often down to a simple 
addition of standard deviations, sometimes, a square root of the sum of the 
squares if there is no evidence of dependency. 
 
•  Risks are assessed under static portfolios or business status quo assumptions and 
therefore over different time horizons according to the realism of such 
assumptions.  Obviously, some risks will naturally evolve faster than others and 
indeed some exposures can be reduced, if need be, much faster than others.  But it 
would be difficult to describe the dynamics of these risks or the effect of 
management policies over the long term. Thus, typically, liquid market risks are 
assessed over a couple of weeks, operational risks over a year and the less liquid 
credit risks perhaps until maturity of the relevant exposures. 
 
•  Risk assessments are summarized into a single number at an early stage.  
Commonly, the difference between the expected value and some low quantile of a 
P&L distribution is defined as the risk ‘metric’.  Because the main role of capital 
in financial firms is to absorb risks, the terms risk capital or economic capital 
(EC) are now widely used to describe the chosen risk metric and to distinguish 
this internal assessment from the externally imposed MRC. 
 
These three features and a few others – such as the uneven attention given to various 
types of risks – make it difficult to generate a reliable, comprehensive picture of all 
risks in a firm.  The recent survey of internal methods of risk aggregation (Basel, 
2003) confirms a wide interest in this problem but also the current lack of satisfactory 
methodologies. It concludes that these efforts should be strongly encouraged but that 
regulators should remain ‘cautious’, read, be wary of any method that could lead to a 
reduction in MRC. Hence the current primitive but supposedly conservative view of 
aggregation across risk types and among operational risks adopted in the Basel II 
proposals 
Risks in Risk Models 
 
A philosopher wrote:
5 “If a man will begin with certainties, he will end up with 
doubts, but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he may end with certainties”.  It 
                                                                 
5 Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Great Instauration ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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is indeed salutary to realize how much uncertainty there is in current financial risk 
assessments before putting forward new ideas for better risk aggregation. 
 
(i) Uncertainty within each risk class 
 
Even at the most elemental level, there are uncertainties about risk parameters. These 
are smaller for market risks, which are continuously observed, than they are for 
relatively rare credit events and, a fortiori, for extremely rare but significant 
operational risks. We argue (Alexander and Pézier, 2003) that the figures in Table 1 
give a fair order of magnitude of relative errors in the determination of risk estimates 
according to risks class and the risk metric used. These are calculated as the ratio of 
the standard deviation of the risk estimate over the expected value of the risk estimate 
(a ratio commonly known as the coefficient of variation, or CV).  The second column 
of the table shows the CV of the standard deviation risk metric, and the other two 
columns estimate the CV of two quantile based risk metrics.
6 
 
Table 1 – Model risks in risk assessment 
 
% Relative error for  Standard Dev.  1% quantile  0.1% quantile 
Market risk  30  40  50 
Credit risk  60  80  100 




(ii)  Risk in Aggregation across Risk Classes/ Business Units 
 
We encounter three main difficulties in aggregating individual risk estimates: (a) 
difficulties due to the choice of metric, in particular, the extreme quantiles often used 
in the definition of EC, (b) difficulties in the description of co-variations and co-
effects, particularly relevant with extreme risks and multi-risk products, and (c) 
impact of errors in individual estimates. 
  
The use of extreme quantiles for risk metrics, as recommended by the regulator and as 
used in many EC definitions, increases the difficulty of devising a sensible 
aggregation model. Quantiles may be super-additive
8 as well as sub-additive.  In the 
                                                                 
6 Quantile risk metrics are defined as the return levels that will have a probability equal to the quantile 
of not being exceeded. When making risk assessments, many banks use loss distributions rather than 
return distributions.  We prefer to keep to returns as the underlying variable; a low quantile on returns 
such as 1%, corresponds to a 99% quantile on losses. 
7 It is the author’s view that it is nigh impossible to determine such number.  How can one ascertain 
with any accuracy the level of operational losses over the forthcoming year that would not be exceeded 
with a probability of more than 0.1%?  
8 If x a represents the a-quantile of a probability distribution on X, and Y is another random variable, 
then it may well be that the total risk at the same quantile level is greater than the sum of the quantiles 
of each risk: (x + y)a  >  x a + ya . This is called super-additivity and is not a mere mathematical 
curiosity, it does happen with skewed, uncorrelated distributions that one would encounter, for 
example, in bond portfolios.  Some authors (Artzner et alii 1999) have argued for the use of ‘coherent’ ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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first case addition does not provide a ‘safe’ answer.  In the second (and more common 
case) it ignores the benefits of diversification. 
  
The use of linear correlations to describe co-variations has severe limitations.  
Correlation estimates are famously unstable. Often co-dependencies are different in 
extreme circumstances from what they are under normal market conditions.  Copulas
9 
may offer a more fitting description of dependencies under both normal and extreme 
circumstances, using s till a limited number of parameters.  But, whatever the 
description, there will only be scant relevant historical evidence on extreme co-
variations to support it. 
 
In some instances, there are known functional relationships between risk types at the 
instrument level, but these are overlooked when doing separate evaluations for each 
risk type.  For example, in a forward contract, counterparty exposure exists only when 
the underlying price moves in a favourable direction; it is impossible to incur both 
market and credit losses
10.  That relationship is lost if the two risks are estimated 
separately.  But for any sizable portfolio it appears unfeasible to analyse all risks 
simultaneously.   
 
There is however one saving grace in the midst of all these difficulties: only the most 
important risks and dependencies matter. The smaller risks, by themselves, are 
negligible if they are not significantly correlated with major risks. This is typical of 
the aggregation of operational risks with other risks. Operational risks by themselves 
are assumed by Basel to be only a fraction, perhaps 10%, of market and credit risks. 
Our argument is that the marginal effect of operational risks on total risk should be 
negligible unless operational risks are significantly correlated to market and/or credit 
risks; presently, for most operational risks, there is no strong argument in favor of 
either a positive or a negative correlation with other risks.
11 
 
(iii) Errors due to inadequate accounting and overlooked risks 
 
The inadequate recognition of expected gains and losses under accrual accounting has 
led the regulator to include some assessment of expected losses for credit and 
operational risks in the evaluation of MRC.  Thus, in the regulator’s view, capital is 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
risk metrics with sub-additivity among other desirable properties.  Why such properties should be 
necessary conditions for the ‘coherence’ of a risk metric remains unclear to many readers.  Indeed, can  
a risk metric be termed ‘coherent’ without specifying its usage as a decision criterion?  
9 See for example Bouye et alii 2001 
10 For this reason, as noted by Pezier (1997), the integration of credit risk with market risk for par value 
OTC derivatives produces a total standard deviation smaller than with market risks only.  On a global 
scale, the effect may be considerable.  Worldwide, the underlying notional of OTC derivatives exceeds 
the notional of loans by a factor of about twelve.  Credit risks for OTC derivatives are based on mark to 
market value when positive plus add-ons, with an adhoc but not generous formula for the netting of 
add-ons.  As a result, total OTC derivative credit risk, amounts to a significant fraction (25%?) of credit 
risks attributed to loans, when realistically the marginal effect above market risks may be very small.  
11 Some type of operational risks may increase in a period of stress when profitability is squeezed; other 
types may be more frequent when business is good and the volume of transactions is high. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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not strictly a buffer against risks; it is also a buffer to absorb unaccounted expected 
losses.  This expedient solution to the accounting problem raises its own difficulties: 
 
-  Expected losses (or gains) should be estimated over the whole life of the 
corresponding instruments, whereas risks are usually estimated over a shorter, 
single time horizon like one year (although regulations are not always clear about 
that choice). 
-  Expected losses are always additive, whereas risks generally are not. 
-  Subtracting a loss from eligible capital (numerator) does not produce the same 
effect on the capital ratio as adding it to the risk weighted assets (denominator) – 
even after multiplication by an ad hoc factor.
12 
 
Also linked to accounting limitations are a number of risks that are simply ignored 
because they are too difficult to assess. These risks include most market risks in 
banking books, but more importantly, most business, reputational and systemic risks. 
This is all the more disturbing that many bankruptcies can be traced to such risks. 
 
Accounting standards are not designed for risk management, nor can they ever be, but 
they form a basis for the recognition of risks.  The development of new regulatory risk 
assessment rules and capital standards should therefore be intimately linked to the 
development of new international accounting standards (IAS39).  In the meantime, 
regulatory rules must be judiciously adapted to local accounting standards. 
 
(i)  Consequences of Risk Model Risks 
 
The global risk picture that emerges is likely to be incomplete and distorted, probably 
drawing unwarranted attention to minor risks, and not reflecting diversification that 
could lead to an improvement in the balance of risks and returns. 
 
To illustrate this point, Alexander and P ézier (2003) consider a bank with three 
business lines reporting the 0.1% confidence level EC figures shown in Table 2a.  
Total EC figures are assumed to be evaluated accurately and to be additive 
(correlation of +1) across business lines and risk classes.  Total EC is 100 so that 
figures in each cell can be read as the marginal percentage contribution of each risk 
category to the total.  For example, a 1% increase in retail banking credit risk would 
increase total risk by 0.5%, and a 1% increase in retail banking overall risk would 
increase total risk by 0.59%. 
                                                                 
12 To illustrate, consider a bank has been set a minimum solvency ratio of 12%; its qualifying capital is 
100 and risk weighted assets 600.  Its solvency ratio is 16.7%, well above the 12% minimum.  
However, new operational risks estimates reveal expected losses (EL) of 8 and unexpected losses (UL)  
of 12 that must now be taken into account.  There is a choice between (a) recognizing EL in the 
accounts and deducting it from capital, and (b) including (EL) in the operational risk capital charge.  
Note that capital charges for market and operational risks are multiplied by 12.5 and added to risk 
weighted assets in the denominator of the capital ratio.  The new solvency ratios would be: 
With (a):  (100 – 8)/(600 + 12.5*12) = 12.27% still above the minimum of 12% 
With (b):  (100)/(600 + 12.5*(8+12)) = 11.76% below the minimum of 12% ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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Table 2a – Percentage contributions to total risk: 
Precise EC valuations, complete dependence 
 
  Credit  Market  Operational 
& Business 
Total 
Retail Banking  50  5  4  59 
Trading & Sales  10  25  4  39 
Brokerage  0  0  2  2 
Total per class  60  30  10  100 
 
 
Suppose now that all risk categories are independent and that the 0.1% EC evaluations 
are subject to the measurement error shown in the last column of Table 1. The 
marginal percentage contribution of each risk category to the total would then be as 
shown in Table 2b (rounded to nearest per cent).  Because of uncertainty in risk 
assessments, and independence of errors, relatively large credit risks are perceived as 
even larger, whereas small ones, like operational & business risks nearly disappear.
13 
 
Table 2b – Percentage contributions to total risk: 
 Uncertain EC valuations, independence of risks 
 
  Credit  Market  Operational 
& Business 
Total  
Retail Banking  81.4  0.5  0.9  82.8 
Trading & Sales  3.3  12.7  0.9  16.9 
Brokerage  0  0  0.3  0.2 
Total per class  84.7  13.2  2.1  100 
 
Finally, revisit the results in Table 2b by introducing a perfect correlation in each 
business line between operational & business risks and credit risks (errors in estimates 
are still taken to be independent).  The marginal percentage contribution of each risk 
category to total risk would be as shown in Table 2c.   
 
Table 2c – Percentage contributions to total risk: 
Independence except between Operational & Business Risks and Credit Risks 
 
  Credit  Market  Operational 
& Business 
Total  
Retail Banking  79.4  0.5  2.4  82.3 
Trading & Sales  3.7  12.2  1.5  17.4 
Brokerage  0  0  0.2  0.2 
Total per class  83.2  12.7  4.2  100 
                                                                 
13 Figures in Table 2b are obtained by squaring each central cell in Table 1, multiplying the result by 
(1+CV
2) where CV is taken from the last column of Table 1 for the relevant risk class, adding to obtain 
marginal totals and scaling the grand total to 100
2. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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Suddenly operational & business risks have regained in importance to such an extent 
that they become much more significant than market risks in retail banking and a third 
of market risks in total. 
 
Looking at risks with different dependency assumptions is like looking through a 
kaleidoscope.  The image can change suddenly and reveal significant features that 
were hidden under different assumptions. 
 
The use by banks of current MRC or EC evaluations for setting overall capital ratios 
compatible with a solvency target is even more problematic.  The financial soundness 
of a bank depends on much more than its capital ratio.  Factors such as the quality of 
its management and controls, the ability to generate profits, the buoyancy of the 
markets in which it operates, the capacity to raise capital and the likelihood to receive 
government support if difficulties surface, are all relevant and should be considered 
over the long term.  All such factors are taken into account by international rating 
agencies.  Their ratings have proved, on average over the years, to be closely related 
to historical frequencies of default.  However the correspondence between  credit 
ratings and capital ratios is weak. 
 

















Figure 1 presents data from Fitch IBCA comparing Tier 1 capital ratios to Moody’s 
ratings for a selection of major international banks over the late 1990s.  Chris Matten 
(2000) who reproduces these figures gives various reasons for some outliers but 
concludes: “Even deleting the outliers, however, there is no statistical relationship 
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Three Adapted Risk Aggregation Models 
 
Is it possible to improve on the current risk aggregation methodologies that are  
limited to simple addition of risk metrics or the use of unreliable correlation 
coefficients?  One should note first that great progress have been made over the last 
ten years within two major risk classes: market and credit risks.  Basel has recognized 
the use of value-at-risk (VAR) models (with precise specifications) and is even basing 
new credit risk capital requirements for the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach on 
its own portfolio model including various correlation assumptions for different 
markets and some measures of concentration (Basel 2001a and 2001b).  The same 
cannot be said about operational risks where the diversity of circumstances and the 
rarity of large losses conspire to make it nearly impossible to arrive at reliable 
estimates of losses at the required confidence level of 99.9% over a year.  In the 
circumstances, capital requirements for operational risks look rather premature. 
 
Where the main challenge remains, however, is in risk aggregation across risk classes. 
The Joint Forum Work Group (Basel 2003) reports that many financial firms have 
started to use more refined methods than simple addition of economic capital across 
business units and risk types, but with mixed results.  A promising approach, they 
note, is to identify core factors for each of the major risk types, to determine the 
sensitivities of the P&L of each business units to such factors and to conduct global 
VAR analyses on groups of business units up to the firm level. The results are global 
economic capital figures by risk types that must still be combined to reach a single 
total economic capital figure.  As we remarked earlier, this last step is particularly 
difficult as the distributions for various risk types will have different shapes and the 
co-dependencies between these distributions are neither well understood nor easily 
verifiable empirically.  Different correlation assumptions may lead to widely different 
results.  
 
Alexander and P ézier (2003) take this approach further by recognising three main 
applications of global EC estimation that they call Normal, Tail and Strategic Cases 




Normal Case: A Linear Common Risk Factor Model 
 
The Normal case refers to a short-term time horizon, assumes normal market 
circumstances and business as usual. The purpose of the exercise is to assess risks in 
order to achieve an efficient allocation of resources based on the firm’s risk appetite.  
 
A number of common risk factors are identified that affect the performance of various 
business units. The choice depends on the main activities of the firm.  The most 
interesting factors are obviously those that would affect a large number of activities 
and to which exposures can be adjusted.  A given risk factor may influence several 
risk types; for example a credit spread index may affect simultaneously market, credit ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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and operational risks.  In fact, when thinking in terms of common risk factors, the 
traditional categories of risks may appear somewhat artificial.   
 
Using eight common risk factors and a sample bank reflecting an average of the 
distributions of economic capital in a few major banks, the following illustrative 
results are obtained. Table 3 shows the economic capital of the sample bank by 
business lines and risk types.  Total EC is normalized at 100. Table 4 shows the 
economic capital explained by the common risk factors (i.e., residual risks excluded) 
under two assumptions: zero correlations among risk factors and empirical 
correlations over three different time periods.  Finally, Table 5 shows how the 
evaluation of risks could be used to minimize the economic capital by adjusting three 
exposures in one business unit, Trading and Sales, namely, Interest rate, Interest rate 
slope and Equity, leaving all other exposures unchanged. 
 
Table 3: Economic Capital for the Sample Bank 
 
Economic Capital  Market  Credit  Operational  Total 
Corporate Finance  7.2  4.8  2  14 
Trading and Sales  13.3  7.3  3.8  24.4 
Retail Banking  3  10.3  2.2  15.5 
Commercial Banking  2.1  24.1  1.3  27.5 
Payment and Settlement  0.3  1.6  1.2  3.1 
Agency and Custody  0.7  1.3  0.9  2.9 
Asset Management  6.5  3.4  0.6  10.5 
Retail Brokerage  0.9  0.9  0.3  2.1 




Table 4: Risk Capital Estimates by Risk Factors 
 
                                              Jan 66 - Dec 85                    Jan 86 - Dec 98                 Jan 99 - Dec 02 
  Correlations  Correlations  Correlations 
Risk Factors  Zero  Empirical  Zero  Empirical  Zero  Empirical 
Interest Rates  51.24  35.40  20.74  19.09  20.32  15.53 
Equity  8.49  8.86  12.77  15.51  13.03  16.13 
Credit Spread  12.49  5.33  16.18 
All Market and Credit  56.30  38.84  26.30  28.52  29.93  26.69 
Operational   4.33 
Total  57.73  39.91  27.16  29.40  30.84  27.55 
 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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Table 5: Modification of Exposures to Minimise Risks 
 
Market and Credit 
Risk Capital 
Before Optimization  After Optimization: 
Corporate Finance  5.65  5.65 
Trading and Sales  10.98  14.34 
Retail Banking  5.27  5.27 
Commercial Banking  11.92  11.92 
Payment and Settlement  0.37  0.37 
Agency and Custody  0.34  0.34 
Asset Management  3.66  3.66 
Retail Brokerage  0.99  0.99 
Total EC:  26.69 
 
22.09 
     
 
Sum of Sensitivities  Before Optimization  After Optimization: 
Interest Rate, r  -0.0379  -0.0191 
Slope, s  -0.0310  -0.0096 
Equity, e  0.1048  -0.0545 
 
 
A few comments are called for: 
 
•  The total of economic capital of 100 in Table 3 corresponds to the unrealistic 
assumption of perfect positive dependence among all risks.  An equally 
unrealistic assumption of zero correlation among all risks and business units 
would yield a total EC of 33.31. 
 
•  In Table 4, the zero correlation assumption is now between risk factors; total EC 
varies markedly with the time period (between 57.73 and 27.16) demonstrating 
large changes in risk factor volatilities over time 
 
•  Since the figures in Table 4 do not include the residual risks not explained by the 
risk factors – which residuals may be of the same order of magnitude as the 
explained risks – the figure of 30.84 for zero factor correlation during the last 
period seem relatively large compared to the 33.31 obtained with zero correlation 
among risk types and business units.  This suggests that the assumption of zero 
correlation between business units is probably unwarranted.  Several business 
units may indeed be exposed to the same risk factors in the same direction. 
 
•  Table 4 also shows that empirical correlations vary significantly over time. A 
detailed look at the risk factors over the corresponding periods would rapidly 
reveal why (e.g., effect of the technology bubble on credit spreads during the last 
period).  Economic capital under empirical correlations may or may not be 
smaller than under zero correlation.  The zero correlation case is not an extreme 
case. It all depends on the relative sensitivities to various factors. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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•  Table 5 refers to only the last period (Jan 99 – Dec 02) and does not include 
operational risks, hence the lower total EC of 26.69 before optimization.  The 
optimization shows that the three sensitivities that have been modified are all 
reduced, but not to zero because of correlations among risk factors.  Total EC is 
reduced from 26.69 to 22.09 but the economic capital of the Trading and Sales 
unit that has modified its exposures jumps up from 10.98 to 14.34.  Thus the unit 
implementing the optimization suffers from an increase in its stand-alone EC  
whilst effecting a reduction in total EC.  Its performance measurement should 
therefore reflect its marginal risk contribution.  More realistic optimization 
problems (e.g., taking into account expected returns as well as risks, limits on 




Tail Case: A Non-Linear Risk Factor Model with Tail Dependencies 
 
Many risk managers are asked to consider extreme circumstances over periods 
extending to one year and to ensure that capital is adequate to cover risks with a 
confidence level of 99.9% or more.  Some banks actually set their capital targets as 
high as the 99.98% confidence level over a year, to be consistent with a target rating 
of ‘AA’ (although, as we have seen earlier, there is no clear relationship between 
capital ratios and credit ratings). 
 
Such questions are impossible to answer without making heroic assumptions about 
policies and the dynamics of a number of activities in addition to the dynamics of the 
markets.  But because these questions are raised by the financial supervisors 
themselves, they must be answered.  Alexander and Pézier (2003) indicate that a mere 
extrapolation of their linear factor model would be extremely unreliable.  Fudge 
factors would have to be invented to scale risks over time and to translate standard 
deviations into extreme quantiles when the shapes of the underlying distributions are 
not well known. 
 
As a palliative they suggest that at least two improvements be made to the ‘normal 
case’ model just described.  First that possible non-linear effects for large variations 
of risk factors be taken into account in the P&L; there is no theoretical difficulty in 
that.  Second, that the description of the tails of the risk factor distributions and of 
their dependencies be refined.  They put forward some relatively simple suggestions 
for these improvements.  They describe major risk factors with a mixture of two 
normal distributions designed to fit not only the mean and standard deviations of the 
empirical distributions but also their excess kurtosis and 1% quantiles.
14 Tail 
dependencies are estimated by calculating correlations after eliminating the core 
observations where two factors are observed simultaneously in their mid 90% range.  
They find that tail dependencies are generally stronger and more significant than 
                                                                 
14  For a discussion of normal mixture modeling, see Alexander, 2001 ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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overall dependencies (e.g., the daily tail correlation between the S&P500 index and 
the VIX volatility index is – 0.91, whereas the overall correlation is –0.83).  They also 
find that daily correlations are often different from correlations estimated on monthly 
variations (e.g., on a monthly basis there is often a positive correlation between the 
slope of the yield curve and the 10year Baa credit spread over 10year US-Treasuries, 
whereas the correlation is significantly negative on a daily basis).  
 
Overall, the tail case model shows that the P&L distribution has lower standard 
deviation with empirical tail correlations among risk factors than with no correlations.  
However the tails of the distribution are much fatter with empirical correlations than 
with zero correlations. A simple extrapolation of the ‘normal case’ linear model could 
not account for these complex effects. 
 
 
Strategic Case: A Business Model 
 
Despite all the efforts put into refining a ‘tail case’ factor model, I do not believe that 
it will ever be able to produce a total economic capital estimate that – if met – would 
be a major determinant of solvency over the long term and therefore of credit rating.  
Capital adequacy at any point in time is indeed only one among many factors that will 
affect the long-term survivability of a firm, and probably  not the most important 
factor. 
 
If one is serious about exploring the long term, one should draw a dynamic picture 
where management reactions to possible extreme circumstances are taken into 
account.  It takes a broad brush to paint this vast canvas.  Only major factors should 
be described.  Among these are the ability to generate fee based earnings as well as 
the impact of possible extreme market conditions.  Management’s reactions should be 
focused on major strategic decisions from hedging some major exposures to realizing 
some assets and even closing down some activities. 
 
A generic tool for depicting such a business model is an ‘influence diagram’.  The 
diagram consists of three types of nodes representing risk factors, decisions and 
outcomes.  With arrows, it describes the direction of causal relationships between 
external risk factors, management decisions and outcomes.  The risk factors are the 
major sources of uncertainty that could affect the firm over the long-term.  They 
include market factors but also competition, the strength of the management team and 
the quality of the risk management function – factors which are routinely taken into 
account by equity analysts and rating agents. Decisions are choices among key 
strategies.  As we draw an influence diagram, each decision may be set at the status 
quo and the likely outcomes can be examined on this basis.  But the main value of the 
analysis is to identify and evaluate alternative courses of action, especially under 
exceptional circumstances. 
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Business models have been used in many industries and government agencies to 
facilitate strategic planning.
15 They are also used by corporate finance houses to 
explore the effects of mergers and acquisitions, but, to my knowledge, they are not 
routinely used by financial firms to explore their own future.  Long-term strategic 
plans and forecasts are notoriously precarious, if only because it is impossible to 
predict true innovations, but a dynamic business model  – as opposed far-fetched 
extrapolations from the status quo  – will shed some light and get a firm better 
prepared for the future. 
  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
Basel II ‘risk sensitive’ capital requirements form the first pillar of regulatory control. 
A minimum regulatory capital is set at a level which, the Basel Committee believes, is 
consistent with a single ‘A’ credit rating or better.  But both theoretical considerations 
and empirical evidence show that, given the regulatory assessment methods for capital 
ratios, there is no significant relationship between capital ratios and probabilities of 
default. The two main weaknesses of current practices lie in inadequacies in risk 
assessment over the medium term and primitive risk aggregation methods. 
 
Financial firms are trying to palliate these weaknesses by developing their own risk 
assessment methodologies and translating the results into a measure of so-called 
‘economic capital’ for comparison with ‘minimum regulatory capital’. Central to 
these internal methodologies is the issue of aggregation among various risk types in 
order to understand the contribution of each activity to overall risks and returns and to 
set a target level for overall capital adequacy.  We have argued that these two 
problems – as well as intermediate questions – justify separate approaches, each with 
their own assumptions and analytical tools. 
 
A large fraction of short-term P&L variations by business unit and overall can be 
explained by a linear, common risk factor model. Unexplained residual risks are likely 
to be independent or to point towards additional common risk factors. There is no 
need to explore extreme variations and calculate capital requirements at a very high 
level of confidence when the purpose is only to decide on an efficient allocation of 
resources.  The linear model is sufficiently simple to address a variety of optimization 
problems.  But we stopped short of discussing the twin issues of choice of risk 
adjusted performance measures and implementation of optimal allocation of resources 
because it would require too much space. 
 
The use of a model designed for normal circumstances would give unreliable 
estimates of extreme losses, that is losses which might have a probability of 
occurrence as low as 0.1% per annum.  So we have proposed several refinements to 
                                                                 
15 See the recent study by the Committee of Sponsoring Opganizations of the Treadway Commission 
(Coso 2003) for a comprehensive disccusion of the methodologies, benefits and limitations of  
enterprise risk management. ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2003-11 
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the basic linear  risk factor model including: a better description of extreme 
movements of risk factors, estimations of co-dependencies for extreme movements, 
and non-linearities in the P&L as a function of the risk factors.  Although we did not 
have a full, realistic set of data to test these refinements, they appear to provide a 
useful basis for assessing extreme quantiles of the P&L distribution over the medium 
term.  A major weakness of this approach, however, is that it does not account for any 
corrective action by management under extreme adverse conditions. 
 
The nub of the problem, when exploring extreme circumstances, is indeed to create 
and evaluate contingency plans.  A typical ‘A’ rated financial firm would not 
suddenly find itself in serious difficulties unless i t was hit by a totally unforeseen 
event; in which case a large capital buffer might still be insufficient.  More likely, the 
situation could deteriorate over months, or years, due to adverse circumstances, or 
poor strategy – but management, in the meantime, would take all possible corrective 
measures.  It seems, therefore, eminently useful to develop – with the assistance of 
senior management – a business model to draw strategic plans for normal and adverse 
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